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David Fuller, etal. vs. Dave Callister, etal.
David Fuller, Shirley Fuller vs. Dave Callister, Confluence Management LLC, Liberty Partners Inc
Date

Code

User

10/21/2008

NCOC

CCGARDAL

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Ronald J. Wilper

COMP

CCGARDAL

Complaint Filed

Ronald J. Wilper

SMFI

CCGARDAL

Summons Filed (3)

Ronald J. Wilper

12/1/2008

AMCO

CCGARDAL

Amended Complaint Filed

Ronald J. Wi/per

12/12/2008

NOlO

CCDWONCP

Three Day Notice Of Intent To Take Default

Ronald J. Wilper

12/22/2008

NOAP

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Appearance M Jones for Callister,
Confluence and Liberty

Ronald J. Wilper

ANSW

MCBIEHKJ

Answer Jones for Callister Confluence and Uberty Ronald J. Wilper

NOTC

DCJOHNSI

Notice of Status Conf

Ronald J. Wilper

HRSC

DCJOHNSI

Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/03/2009 04:00
PM)

Ronald J. Wi/per

1/1412009

NOSV

CCGWALAC

Notice Of Service

Ronald J. Wi/per

2/3/2009

STIP

MCBIEHKJ

Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning

Ronald J. Wilper

HRVC

DCJOHNSI

Hearing result for Status held on 02/03/2009
04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated

Ronald J. Wi/per

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/21/200909:00 Ronald J. Wilper
AM) 4 days

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference
10/13/2009 03:30 PM)

Ronald J. Wilper

ORDR

DCABBOSM

Order Setting Proceedings and Trial

Ronald J. Wi/per

2/18/2009

NOSV

CCGARDAL

Notice Of Service

Ronald J. Wilper

3/19/2009

NOTS

CCDWONCP

Notice Of Service

Ronald J. Wilper

3/26/2009

NOTS

CCRANDJD

Notice Of Service

Ronald J. Wilper

6/23/2009

MOTN

CCTOWNRD

Motion for Order Shortening Time

Ronald J. Wilper

AFSM

CCTOWNRD

Affidavit In Support Of Motion

Ronald J. Wilper

NOHG

CCTOWNRD

Notice Of Hearing

Ronald J. Wilper

HRSC

CCTOWNRD

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment 07/20/2009 11 :00 AM)

Ronald J. Wilper

MOSJ

CCBOYIDR

Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

Ronald J. Wi/per

AFFD

CCBOYIDR

(2) Affidavit in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Ronald J. Wilper

MEMO

CCBOYIDR

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

Ronald J. Wilper

6/25/2009

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order to Shorten Time

Ronald J. Wilper

7/6/2009

MEMO

CCWRIGRM

Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Ronald J. Wilper

AFFD

CCWRIGRM

Affidavit of Michael R Jones

Ronald J. Wilper

REPL

CCHOLMEE

Reply Brief to Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Ronald J. Wilper

AFFD

CCHOLMEE

Ronald J. Wilper
Supplemental Affidavit of Ed J Guerricabeitia in
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

12/31/2008

2/1312009

7/10/2009

Judge
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Date

Code

User

7/20/2009

DCHH

DCJOHNSI

Ronald J. Wilper
Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment held on 07/20/2009 11 :00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: madsen
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:50

8/24/2009

DEOP

DCJOHNSI

Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment

Ronald J. Wilper

9/1/2009

OBJC

CCTOWNRD

Objection to the Form of Defendant's Proposed
Judgment

Ronald J. Wilper

NOHG

CCTOWNRD

Notice Of Hearing

Ronald J. Wilper

HRSC

CCTOWNRD

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
09/28/200902:00 PM) Objection to Form of
Defendant's Proposed Judgment

Ronald J. Wilper

JDMT

DCJOHNSI

Judgment Against Plaintiffs

Ronald J. Wilper

CDIS

DCJOHNSI

Civil Disposition entered for: Callister, Dave,
Defendant; Confluence Management LLC,
Defendant; Liberty Partners Inc, Defendant;
Fuller, David, Plaintiff; Fuller, Shirley, Plaintiff.
Filing date: 9/28/2009

Ronald J. Wilper

STAT

DCJOHNSI

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Ronald J. Wilper

MEMC

CCPRICDL

Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees

Ronald J. Wilper

AFSM

CCPRICDL

Affidavit In Support Of Memorandum and
Attorney Fees

Ronald J. Wilper

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

CCPRICDL

Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Defendant's Costs
and Attorney Fees

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

CCPRICDL

Plaintiffs Motion to Stay Decision on Attorney
Fees and Costs Pending Appeal

Ronald J. Wilper

MEMO

CCPRICDL

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of their Motion Ronald J. Wilper
to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees

NOTH

CCPRICDL

Notice Of Hearing

Ronald J. Wilper

HRSC

CCPRICDL

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/09/200903:30
AM) to Disallow Defendant's Attorney Costs

Ronald J. Wilper

STAT

CCPRICDL

STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk
action

Ronald J. Wilper

10/27/2009

CONT

DCJOHNSI

Continued (Motion 11/09/200903:30 PM) to
Disallow Defendant's Attorney Costs

Ronald J. Wilper

11/6/2009

REPL

CCNELSRF

Defendants Reply to Plainitiffs Memorandum to
Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees

Ronald J. Wilper

11/9/2009

DCHH

DCJOHNSI

Hearing result for Motion held on 11/09/2009
03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: cromwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: to Disallow Defendant's Attorney
Costs-50

Ronald J. Wilper

STATUS CHANGED: closed

Ronald J. Wilper

9/2812009

10/9/2009

10/21/2009

STAT

DCJOHNSJ

Judge
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12/4/2009

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order of Costs and Fees

Ronald J. Wilper

12/8/2009

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court
Docket No. 37035

Ronald J. Wilper

1/13/2010

NOTA

CCTHIEBJ

Notice Of Cross Appeal

Ronald J. Wilper

Judge
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E DON COPPLE

ED GUERRICABEITIA
DA VISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-3658
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428
ISB Nos.: 1085 & 6148
Attorneys for PlaintitTs
David and Shirley Fuller
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DA VID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a married couple,)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)

CASE NO.: CV OC 0820018
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

DA VE CALLISTER, an individual,
)
CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Idaho )
Limited Liability Company, and LIBERTY
)
PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho corporation,
)
)

Defendants.

)

COME NOW Plaintiffs, David and Shirley Fuller, by and through their attorneys of
record of the firm, Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, and hereby submits this memorandum in
support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 20, 2005, Plaintiffs entered into a Commercial/Investment Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Agreement with Defendant Cont1uence Management, LLC. See AfT of
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I

Fuller, Ex. A. That same day, the parties executed an Addendum where Plaintiffs were to
receive the funds paid by ACHD. See id., Ex. B.
On September 22. 2005, PlaintitTs and Defendants Conf1uence Management and Liberty
Partners executed another Addendum where PlaintitTs consented to the prope11y vesting with
Liberty Partners. See id., Ex. C.
On August 10, 2006, Defendant Liberty Partners executed a Sale and Purchase
Agreement with ACHD and warranty deed conveying a portion of the property. See AfT. ofEJG,
Exs. A & B.
On or about August 25,2006, ACHD issued a check to Transnation Title & Escrow in the
amount of$83,921.00 for the property ACHD acquired. See id., Ex. C. The property closed on
October 20,2006 at LandAmerica Transnation and a payment of $83,921.00 was issued to
Liberty Partners, Inc. See id., Ex. D.
Neither Defendants Confluence Management or Liberty Partners turn over the
condemnation proceeds received from ACHD to Plaintiffs. See Aff. of Fuller.
II. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if no genuine issue of material fact
exists. Orlhman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597, 600, 944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997).
Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or
draw cont1icting inferences from evidence. Id.

A "material fact" for summary judgment

purposes is one upon which the outcome of the case may be different. Peterson v. Romine, 131
Idaho 537, 540, 960.P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998).

In determining whether or not to grant summary

judgment, the court is to liberally construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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of the nonmoving party. Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771,774,828 P.2d 334,337 (Ct. App.
1992). Nevertheless, raising doubts as to a material fact is not sufficient because the nonmoving
party must produce substantial evidence that demonstrates a material fact is in dispute, a mere
scintilla of evidence is not sufficient. Ambrose v. Buhl Joint School District #412, 126 Idaho
581,583,887 P.2d 1088, 1091 (et. App. 1994).
B. The Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement did not

Merge with the Recorded Warranty Deed.
In their Answer, Defendants alleged as their ninth affirmative defense that "Plaintiffs
claim for relief is barred against all Defendants because all contractual obligations contained in
the Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement merged with the recorded
Warranty Deed." See Defendants' Answer.
As part of the Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement
executed by the Plaintiffs and Defendant Confluence Management on September 20,2005, the
parties executed an Addendum that same day where Defendant Confluence Management and
Plaintiffs agreed to reserve the proceeds from the acquisition of a portion of the subject property
by ACHD under the threat or condemnation to Plaintiffs. The Agreement was assigned to
Delcndant Liberty Partners, Inc. on September 22,2005 and Plaintiffs executed a Warranty Deed
for the benefit of Defendant Liberty Partners, Inc. Defendant Liberty Partners, Inc. negotiated
wi th ACHD for the sale of a portion of the property and kept the proceeds paid by ACHD in
breach of the Agreement.
In Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 118 P.3d 99 (2005), the Idaho Supreme Court
explained the application of the doctrine of merger of a real estate agreement and the deed.
Here, Sells sold 20 acres of their property to Robinson. Under their agreement, Sells
granted an easement on their remaining portion of property and the timber rights on that
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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easement were included. After the execution of the agreement, the Sells executed a warranty

deed which described the Robinson easement over the Sells' property and timber rights located
on the easement. Robinson interpreted that both the agreement and warranty deed granted him
timber rights to all of Sells' remaining property and proceeded to log his twenty acres, as well as

the Sells remaining acres.
Sells sued Robinson for trespass and conversion and the case was tried to the court
without a jury. The court found in Sells favor and applied the doctrine of merger holding the
agreement merged into the deed so only the terms of deed would be considered. Robinson
appealed the court's ruling.
Relying on its past decision in Jolley v. Idaho Sec., Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P.2d 879
(1966), the Court defined the doctrine of merger as follows:
[T]he acceptance of a deed to premises generally is considered as a merger of the
agreements of an antecedent contract into the terms of the deed, and any claim for
relief must be based on the covenants of agreements contained in the deed, not the
covenants or agreements contained in the prior agreement. (Citation omitted).
The Court recognized that an exception to merger exists, "where under the
contract the rights are conferred collaterally and independent of the deed; there
being no presumption that the party in accepting the deed intends to give up the
covenants of which the deed is not performance or satisfaction." However, the
Court noted that, "[w]here the right claimed under the contract would vary,
change, or alter the agreement in the deed itself, or inheres in the very subjectmatter 'with which the deed deals, a prior contract covering the same subjectmatter cannot be sho'wn against the provisions of the deed" (Emphasis
included).
lei., 141 Idaho at 771-72.

The Court affirmed the district court's application of the doctrine of merger holding that
the terms of the agreement sought to be enforced by Robinson inhered to the vary subject-matter
dealt with by the deed, i.e. the timber on the Sells' property. The Court found that the timber
language in the agreement did not constitute a collateral agreement independent of the deed.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4
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In Jolley, infra., the Idaho Supreme Court further elaborated on the doctrine of merger,

explaining:
"In the absence of fraud, mistake, etc., the following stipulations in contracts for
the sale of real estate are conclusively presumed to be merged in a subsequently
delivered and accepted deed made in pursuance of such contract, to wit: (1) Those
that inhere in the very subject-matter of the deed, such as title, possession,
emblements, etc; (2) those carried into the deed and of the same effect; (3) those
of which the subject -matter in the deed. In such cases the deed alone must be
looked at in determining the rights of the parties.
""But where there are stipulations in such preliminary contract of which the
delivery and acceptance of the deed is not a performance, the question to be
determined is whether the parties have intentionally surrendered or waived such
stipulations. If such intention appears in the deed, it is decisive; if not, then resort
may be had to other evidence.
"The authorities may perhaps be reconciled by a determination of what are
'collateral stipulations.' If the stipulation has reference to title, possession,
quantity, or emblements of the land, it is generally, but not always, held to inhere
in the very subject-matter with which the deed deals, and is merged therein."
ld., 90 Idaho at 383.

In the instant case, the contract reserving the condemnation proceeds with Plaintiffs do
not inhere in the very subject-matter of the deed nor makes reference to the title, possession.
quantity or emblements of the land. Instead it deals with money.
Based upon the foregoing case law, PlaintifTs respectfully request this Court enter its
Order dismissing Defendants ninth affirmative defense.

C. The Assignment of the Property Does Not Relieve Defendant Confluence
Management of Liability under the Agreement.
Defendants alleged as their eighth affirmative defense that "Plaintiffs claim for relief
should be barred against Confluence because Confluence assigned all right to the
Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement that is subject of this suit to
Defendant Liberty. The assignment was agreed to and accepted by PlaintifTs thereby releasing
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5
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Cont1uence from all obligations to Plaintiffs pursuant to said Commercial/Investment Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Agreement." Defendants claim that the novation relieves Defendant
Contluence of any liability under the contract.
Specifically, the assignment/novation states:
The undersigned sellers and buyers agree to the following:
1. The buyers of said property will be assigned to vest as Liberty Partners, Inc. All other
tem1s and conditions shall remain the same. See AfT. of Fuller, Ex. B.
PlaintifTs executed the document along with Defendants Cont1uence Management and
Liberty Partners.
In George W Watkins Family v. lvlessenger, 115 Idaho 386, 766 P.2d 1267 (App.1988),
the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed whether a lessee's assignment to a third party relieved him
of liability from the landlord who consented to the assignment.
On appeal, the lessee argued that the landlord's consent to the assignment relieved him of
liability. The Court of appeals reviewed the lease agreement and held as follows:
In our view the quoted language clearly holds the lessee primarily obligated in the
event of an assignment and subsequent default by the assignee. Absent an express
novation, a lessee remains in privity of contract with the lessors and is a guarantor
for performance of the covenants in the agreement. (Citation omitted). There is
no express novation here. We hold that the lessors' consent to an assignment did
not relieve the lessee of his obligation under the lease agreement.

Id., 115 Idaho at 390.
A mere assignment does not release the assignor from his or her obligations to the other
party under the assigned contract, absent an agreement that can be applied from the facts other
than the other contracting party's consent to the assignment. See Seagull Ener6"Y E&P, Inc. v.
Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342 (Tex.2006).

Even if the assignee assumes the obligations of the contract, the assignor remains
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6
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secondarily liable as a surety or guarantor. See Roget v. Grand Pontiac, Inc., 5 P.3d 341
(Colo.Ct.App. 1999).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs only consented to the property vesting to Liberty Partners.
The assignment does not expressly state or relieve Conf1uence Management of its obligations
under the Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement dated September
20,2005 wherein the ACHD condemnation proceeds were reserved to the Plaintiffs.
Since Liberty Partners took the ACHD proceeds and failed to turn it over to Plaintiffs,
ConL1uence Management is still obligated under the contract to pay said funds to Plaintiffs.
Based upon the foregoing case law, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court enter its
Order dismissing Defendants eighth affirmative defense.

D. Defendants Confluence Management and Liberty Partners Breached the
Agreement by Failing to Return the ACHD proceeds to Plaintiffs.
As noted above, Defendant Conf1uence Management is still obligated to pay the proceeds
received from ACHD to PlaintitTs pursuant to the terms of their contract.
It is undisputed that Liberty Partners received the proceeds paid by ACHD for the

acquisition of a portion of the property which was reserved to Plaintiffs under their agreement
with Conf1uence Management. See Aff. of EJG, Exs. A, B &

c.

The reservation of the condemnation proceeds was a material part of the agreement
which Defendants Conf1uence Management and Liberty Partners breached. Whether Defendant
Liberty Partners assumed Cont1uence Management's obligations under the contract is irrelevant
as PlaintitTs never expressly released Cont1uence Management of its obligations under the
agreement.
ACHD issued a check in the amount of $83,921.00 to the escrow agent who in turn
issued payment in that amount to Liberty Partners who failed to turn over the proceeds to
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT-7

00012

Plaintiffs. See Aff. of EJG, Exs. A, B &

c.

Based upon the undisputed facts, Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court enter its Order
for partial summary judgment against Defendants Cont1uence Management, LLC and Liberty
Partners, Inc. in the amount of $83,921.00, plus prejudgment interest accruing from the date of
the settlement, October 10,2006.
III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts and case authority provided herein, Plaintiffs
respectfully request this Court enter partial summary judgment in favor of PlaintitTs and dismiss
Defendants' eighth and ninth affirmative defenses, as well as, enter partial summary judgment
against Defendant Cont1uence Management, LLC in the an10unt of $83,921.00, plus accrued prejudgment.
f')

ttl

DATED this _.,(_}_ day ofJune, 2009.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE

Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theUaay ofJune, 2009 a true and correct original of the
foregoing was served upon the following by the method indicated below:

Michael R. Jones
Michael R. Jones PLLC
508 North 13 th Street
Boise. Idaho 83702

U.S. MAIL
_X_ Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9
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Michael R. Jones
MICHAEL R. JONES, PLLC
P.O. Box 7743
508 North 13th Street
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone:
(208) 385-7400
Facsimile:
(208) 389-9103
ISB No. 2221
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DA VID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a
married couple,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DA VE CALLISTER, an individual,
CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company, and
LIBERTY PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0820018

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTU'FS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

---------------------------)
COMES NOW the Defendants, DAVID CALLISTER ("Callister"), CONFLUENCE
MANAGEMENT, LLC ("Confluence Management"), and LIBERTY PARTNERS, INC.
("Liherty Partners"), by and through their counsel of record, Michael R. Jones, and submit the
following Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. This
memorandum in further supported by the accompanying affidavit of Michael R. Jones.

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE I
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I.

THE QUESTION PLACED AT ISSUE IN PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On or about September 20, 2005 , the Fuller Plaintiffs sold 12.73 acres of property
located at the common address, 890 N. Ten Mile Road, in or near the city of Meridian, Ada
County, Idaho to the Defendant Liberty Partners for slightly more than 1.25 million dollars
($1,273,000.00).

Liberty Partners was the contract assignee of the Defendant Confluence

Management, the entity that had originally entered into the purchase/sale agreement with the
Fullers.
Almost one year later, on or about August 10, 2006, the Ada County Highway District
("ACHD") paid Liberty Partners $83,921.00 for the purchase of slightly less than one acre (.99
acre) out of the 12.73 acres that had been previously sold by the Fullers to Confluence
Management almost one year earlier (hereinafter referred to as the "ACHD proceeds ").
In this action the Plaintiff Fullers claim that they had reserved a right in the purchase/sale
agreement to receive the ACHD proceeds for the .99 acres that were subsequently paid to Liberty
Partners.

As the defendants in this action, both Liberty and Confluence assert that the

purchase/sale agreement unambiguously limited the Fullers' right to the ACHD proceeds to any
sale or condemnation that occurred prior to the Fullers' September 2005 closing on the sale of the
12.73 acres. And that in any event, the doctrine of merger now precludes the Fullers from
attempting to enforce a contract provision that was not reserved in the deed that has now
superseded the underlying contract.
Therefore, the following question is presented to this Court upon the Fullers' motion for
partial summary judgment:
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Are the Plaintiff Fullers entitled to the $83,921.00 in proceeds that were paid by
the ACHD to the Defendant Liberty Partners on or about August 10, 2006 for the
purchase of approximately one acre of land out of the 12.73 acres of land that
Fullers had previously sold to Liberty's assignor, Confluence Management, on or
about September 20, 2005 for more than 1.25 million dollars?

II.
THE FACTUAL DISPUTE
Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint is a copy of the September 20, 2005 real estate
sales contract between the Fullers and Confluence Management, and its assignee Liberty
Partners. The dispute that is before this Court arises out of the language found in paragraph 10
of that contract, and an "addendum" to that paragraph, l also dated September 20, 2005, which in
relevant part declares as follows:
10.

OTHER TERMS AND/OR CONDITIONS: This Agreement is made
subject to the following special terms, considerations and/or contingencies
which must be satisfied prior to closing ...

3.

Seller to receive any and all funds paid for road right of way
including land, landscaping, fencing, sprinklers and temporary
easements.
Escrow instructions by the title company will cover the receipt and
disbursement of the right of way funds. It is understood that buyer
will be deeding the right of way to ACHD and that the seller, Dave
and Shirley Fuller will receive all said funds paid by ACHD. Said

The last sentence of paragraph 10 declares, "continues on addendum # 2." There
is no "addendum # 2," but there is an "addendum # 1" (Exhibit B to the Amended Complaint),
that declares, "continuation of the Earnest Money Agreement paragraph # 10." There is no
dispute between the parties that this addendum # 1 does provide the additional language
appended to paragraph 10, and that the reference in paragraph 10 to "addendum # 2," is simply a
.
,
scnvener s error.
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amount has not been yet determined and Dave and Shirley Fuller
retain the right to negotiate the amount with ACHD.
(Emphasis added).

III.
LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES RAISED
The Fuller Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to partial summary judgment awarding
them the ACHD proceeds because the Defendants cannot defeat that claim based upon their
ninth affirmative defense encompassing the merger doctrine, which if applicable, would entirely
ddeat the Fullers' claim

or upon the defendants' eight affirmative defense encompassing the

doctrine of contract novation, which would exonerate the Defendant Confluence Management
from an liability because its rights and liabilities were entirely and completely assigned to the
Ddendant Liberty Partners.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Sirius

Le v.

Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 156 P.3d 539 (2007)

directly addressed the question of granting summary judgment based upon the existence of any
genuine issue of material fact involving an affirmative defense:
Erickson asserts that the district court improperly granted summary
judgment with respect to his remaining twelve affirmative defenses because
neither party raised those defenses at summary judgment. When the district court
granted summary judgment for Sirius on the issue of consideration, it also sua
sponte granted summary judgment with respect to Erickson's remaining defenses.
Erickson challenged the district court's dismissal of his remaining affirmative
defenses in his motion for reconsideration and the district court responded by
stating that Erickson had failed to submit any evidence- affidavit, testimony, or
otherwise - that would raise disputed issues of material fact with respect to his
remaining defenses.
Erickson was not required to come forth with evidence creating a
genuine issue of material fact with regard to his remaining affirmative
defenses at the summary judgment stage because neither party put those
defenses at issue. While a court may grant summary judgment in favor of either
a moving or non-moving party upon a motion for summary judgment, its
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authority is limited to the issues placed before it pursuant to the movant's motion.
Harwood, 136 Idaho at 677, 39 P.3d at 617. The record indicates that the only
ground asserted by Erickson in his motion for summary judgment was the defense
of lack of consideration. Sirius did not file its own motion for summary judgment
and thus did not raise any additional issues. Accordingly, when the district court
determined that summary judgment was proper with respect to Erickson's
remaining affirmative defenses, it improperly "seized upon" matters not before it
pursuant to the movant's motion. See Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126
Idaho 527, 531, 887 P.2d lO34, lO38 (1994) (holding that district court
improperly seized upon the issue of proximate cause on summary judgment in
negligence action where no argument was offered regarding this element by the
moving party). We vacate the district court's dismissal of Erickson's remaining
affirmative defenses because they were not at issue in the summary judgment
proceedings.
144 Idaho at 43, 156 P.3d at 544 (emphasis added).
Here, the defendants in their answer to the Fullers' Amended Complaint alleged twelve
affirmative defenses, only two of which - the eighth and ninth - have been raised and put at issue
by the Fullers on their motion for partial summary judgment.
A court can grant summary judgment to the non-moving party when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the non-moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677-78, 39 P.3d 612,617-18 (2001).

IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Fullers'" Alleged Contract Rights Have Been Superseded By The Warranty

The essential elements that must be present to have an enforceable land sale contract
include: (1) identification of the parties involved, (2) identification of the subject matter of the
contract, (3) the price or consideration, (4) a legal description of the property, and (5) all the
essential terms necessary in any particular situation that are required to form an enforceable
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agreement. P.O. Ventures v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 238, 159 P.3d
870, 875 (2007).

In this case the parties included the Fullers and Confluence Management, who
subsequently assigned all its rights as buyer under the contract to Liberty Partners. The subject
matter of the contract was 12.73 acres of property located at 890 N. Ten Mile Road, Meridian,
Idaho. The price for this entire property was identified as $1,273,000.00. A legal description
was appended to both the purchase/sale agreement and the warranty deed. The purchase/sale
agreement provided the remaining essential terms concerning the date of closing, the payment of
the consideration, and the assignment of Confluence Management's rights to Liberty Partners.
Under the doctrine of merger these essential terms of an enforceable land sale contract
constitute the very terms that are merged into a subsequent deed. The Defendants in this action
concur with the Plaintiff Fullers' statement of the merger doctrine as recently set out in Sells v.

Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 771-72, 118 P.3d 99, 103-04 (2005), which incorporated the
declaration of that doctrine made in, Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P.2d 879
(1966), to the effect that,
[T]he acceptance of a deed to premises generally is considered a merger of the
agreements of an antecedent contract into the terms of the deed, and any claim
for relief must be based on the covenant or agreements contained in the deed,
not the covenants or agreements as contained in the prior agreement.
90 Idaho at 382, 414 P.2d at 884 (emphasis added). As stated in Sells, the following test is
applied:
H[w]here the right claimed under the contract would vary, change, or alter the
agreement in the deed itself, or inheres in the very subject-matter with which the
deed deals, a prior contract covering the same subject-matter cannot be shown
against the provisions of the deed. H
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141 Idaho at 771-72, 118 P.3d at 103-04 (italicized emphasis in original).
The Fullers do not dispute the fact that the warranty deed in this case does not incorporate
and preserve any right in them to receive the ACHD proceeds that are at issue, and consequently
they predicate their claim entirely upon the underlying real estate purchase/sale agreement. The
Fullers have argued in support of their motion for partial summary judgment that the contract
provision that they are attempting to enforce does not address matters that are inherent in the
subject matter of the deed, such as title, possession, quantity or emblements of the land, but
rather that the contract provision at issue it only deals with "money." See, Fullers' Summary
Judgment Memorandum at pg. 5.
The consideration paid, the amount of land sold, and the legal description of that land, are
all essential elements necessary to form an enforceable land sale agreement, as declared in the

Po. Ventures decision that was cited above. In order for this Court to decide the Fullers' claim
to the ACHD proceeds that has been made in this case, evidence will be required that delves into
questions of how much land was sold by the Fullers to Confluence Management (was it 12.73
acres? or 12.73 acres minus the .99 acres that ACHD purchased?); the consideration that was
paid (was it $1,273,000? or was it $1,273,000 minus the $83,921 in ACHD proceeds?); and the
legally enforceable description of the property that was sold, as incorporated into the warranty
deed. See, Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 629, 200 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009) ("A description
contained in a deed will be sufficient so long as quantity, identity or boundaries of property can
be determined from the face of the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which it
refers.").
This application of the merger doctrine, so as to preclude evidence arising out of an
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underlying contract that would necessarily alter the terms of the deed itself, is consistent with the
long-standing application of the parol evidence rule to preclude the introduction of evidence that
would alter the terms embodied within the terms of the deed itself. See e.g., Barmore v. Perrone,
145 Idaho 340, 345, 179 P.3d 303, 308 (2008), citing to Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 898 P.2d
1081 (1995). It is significant to the decision of this question that the ACHD itself declared in an
October 28, 2005 letter to the Fullers that it was compelled by controlling Idaho law to negotiate
only with the owner of record - which at that date was Liberty Partners, not the Fullers. See,
Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Michael R. Jones.
In sum, the merger doctrine precludes the Fullers in this case from attempting to enforce
alleged contract rights that would necessarily change three essential elements of an enforceable
land sale contract that are embodied within the terms of the deed itself - (1) the identification of
the property being sold (12.73 acres, or something less), (2) the amount of consideration to be
paid for that property ($1,273,000, or something less), and (3) the precise legal description of
that property. Consequently, because the Fullers cannot prevail upon their claim to the ACHD
proceeds because of the operation of the merger doctrine, not only should their motion for partial
summary judgment be denied, but summary judgment on that claim should be entered for the
Defendants in this action.

B.

Even If The Fullers' Contract Rights Survived Merger Into The Warranty Deed,
Those Rights Lapsed At Closing
As included in the statement of disputed facts set out above, the terms of the contract

upon which the Fullers rely, as stated in paragraph 10 of the purchase/sale agreement were
clearly and unambiguously stated as lapsing, if not exercised and satisfied prior to closing:
This Agreement is made subject to the following special terms, considerations
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and/or contingencies which must be satisfied prior to closing . ..
(Emphasis added).
When the terms of a contract are unambiguous, interpretation of the contract and its legal
effect are questions of law. Opportunity, L.L.e. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605, 38 P.3d
1258, 1261 (2002). An unambiguous contract will be given its plain meaning, which is based on
the words of the contract. Id. A contract must be interpreted in its entirety, without nullifying or
ignoring any provision of that contract. Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 806, 10 P.3d 751, 755
(CLApp.2000).
Paragraph 26 of the purchase/sale agreement declared in bold letters that, "TIME IS OF
THE ESSENCE IN THIS AGREEMENT." Generally, when time is made of the essence in a
real estate sales contract, performance must occur within the prescribed time constraints
contained in that contract. Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc., 134 Idaho 264, 269,1 P.3d
292, 297 (2000); Ujdur v. Thompson, 126 Idaho 6, 9, 878 P.2d 180, 183 (CLApp.1994)
("[W]here the parties make time of the essence in setting a deadline for payment, strict
compliance with such deadline is required. ").
In this case the Fullers were given an opportunity to negotiate a sale with ACHD prior to
closing with Confluence Management. Had the Fullers been successful in their negotiations with
ACHD then necessary adjustments could have been made in the identification of the property
being sold, its legal description, and the consideration to be paid to be paid at closing. The facts
are undisputed that the Fullers neither successfully completed negotiations with ACHD prior to
closing, nor did they thereafter specifically further reserve any continuing right to conduct such
negotiations, or to receive any further compensation from either ACHD, or Confluence
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Management or its assigns (Liberty Partners) as the buyer, as the result of any subsequent sale to,
or condemnation by, ACHD.
Therefore, even if the Fullers' contract right, as embodied within paragraph 10 of the
purchase/sale agreement, had survived merger into the deed, that contract right by its own
unambiguous and express terms lapsed at the time of the Fullers' closing with Confluence
Management and its assignee Liberty Partners.

The Fullers no longer had any enforceable

contract right after the date of that closing to either negotiate or receive proceeds from ACHD
arising from any subsequent sale or condemnation of that property by ACHD. Consequently, the
Fullers are not entitled to summary judgment on their claim to the ACHD proceeds, and because
there are no genuine issues of material fact on this question, summary judgment should be
entered for the Defendants in this action, as a matter of law.

C.

Confluence Management Has No Liability To The Fullers Because It Assigned All
Of' Its Rights Arising Out Of' The Contract And Subsequent Deed to Liberty
Partners
The Fullers have argued in support of their motion for partial summary judgment that the

Defendant Confluence Management is not released from any liability to them as a result of its
assignment of its right as "buyer" under the purchase/sale agreement to Liberty Partners. In
support of their argument the Fullers rely upon the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in George

W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 115 Idaho 386, 766 P.2d 1267 (CLApp.1988), and decisions
from Texas and Colorado.
The lease agreement that was at issue in the Watkins case contained a provision that
specifically declared that in the event of an assignment or sublease that, "the Lessee shall
nevertheless not be relieved form his obligation to fully perform hereunder in the event of the
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default of the assignee. [Underlining original.]" 115 Idaho at 390, 766 P.2d at 1271 (emphasis in
original).

Consequently, the decision rendered in the Watkins case was constrained by

contractual language in which the lessee retained liability notwithstanding any assignment or
sublease. Furthermore, the Fullers have made no argument to this Court that the supporting
authority that they have cited from Texas and Colorado is consistent with existing Idaho law, or
that this out-of-state authority has any persuasive authority as applied to controlling Idaho law.
As applied under Idaho law, an "assignment" and a "sublease", are not synonymous terms
that evoke an equivalent legal meaning. As the Court in Haag v. Pollack, 122 Idaho 605, 836
P.2d 551 (CLApp. 1992) observed:
An assignment, unlike a sublease, disposes of a lessee's entire interest in
the leasehold, and does not reserve to the lessee any reversionary interest.
Fahrenwald v. LaBonte, 103 Idaho 751, 753 n. 1, 653 P.2d 806, 808 n. 1
(CLApp.1982). In other words, an assignment is a transfer of all of one's interest
in property. See 6 AMJUR.2DAssignments 1, at 185 (1963).

122 Idaho at 610,836 P.2d at 556.
As applied to the facts of this case, the controlling general rule of Idaho law provides that
when a contract is assignable, the assignee acquires all the rights and responsibilities of the
assignor, and is thereafter substituted for the assignor.

Van Berkem v. Mountain Home

Development Co., 132 Idaho 639, 641, 977 P.2d 901, 903 (CLApp.1999), citing Anderson v.
Carrigan, 50 Idaho 550, 555, 298 P. 673, 674 (1931). This applicable legal rule was recently
more fully stated as follows in Foley v. Grigg, 144 Idaho 530, 164 P.3d 810 (2007):
An assignment is a transfer of rights or property from one person to
another. Purco Fleet Servs., Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Fin., 140 Idaho 121, 125,
90 P.3d 346, 350 (2004) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 115 (7th ed.1999); 6
AmJur.2d Assignment
1 (1999)). An assignment "confers a complete and
present right in the subject matter to the assignee." Id. (quoting 6 AmJ ur.2d
Assignment 1 (1999)). "[A]n assignee takes the subject of the assignment with
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all the rights and remedies possessed by and available to the assignor." 6
Am.Jur.2d Assignment 144 (1999) (emphasis added). Once an assignor makes an
assignment, he no longer retains control of the subject of the assignment. See
First State Bank of Eldorado v. Rowe, 142 Idaho 608, 612, 130 P.3d 1146, 1150
(2006).
144 Idaho at 533, 164 P.3d at 813 (italicized emphasis in original).

Even if this Court should find that the Fullers retain a contractual right to pursue the relief
they seek in respect to the ACHD proceeds, or that they have not lost this contractual right due to
the doctrine of merger, no factual or legal basis exists in this case upon which they are entitled to
pursue either the Defendant Confluence Management, or the Defendant David Callister,
individually, inasmuch as neither of these named defendants has any enforceable legal obligation
to the Fullers. Defendant, Callister, was not at any time pertinent to these claims acting as an
individual and, therefore, should not be a named party in this claim. Therefore, this Court should
deny the Fullers' motion for summary judgment in respect to the Defendants' eighth affirmative
defense, and instead grant summary judgment for both Confluence and Callister individually, as
to any claim made against them in this action by the Fullers.

v.
CONCLUSION
The Fullers' motion for partial summary judgment should be denied. This Court should
enter summary judgment for the defendants' as a matter of law - on the basis that the Fullers have
no enforceable claim to the ACHD proceeds. In the event that this Court does not dismiss the
Fullers claims in their entirety, then the Defendants Confluence, and Callister individually,
should be dismissed due to the absence of any liability in them to the Fullers.
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Respectfully submitted

this~ day of July, 2009.

Attorney for the Defendants
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Michael R. Jones
MICHAEL R. JONES, PLLC
508 N. 13th Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
P. O. Box 7743
Boise, 10 83707
Telephone: (208) 385-7400
Facsimile: (208) 389-9103
ISB No. 2221
mrjones@mcleodusa.net
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DA VID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a married couple,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DA VE CALLISTER, an individual,
CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company, and LIBERTY
PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0820018
Memorandum of Costs
and Attorney Fees

COMES NOW, Defendants, Dave Callister ("Callister"), Confluence Management,
LLC ("Confluence", and Liberty Partners, Inc. ("Liberty") by and through its attorney of
record, Michael R. Jones, PLLC and pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l), 54(d)(5), and 54(e)(I), seeks
an award of attorneys' fees and costs as prevailing party in the litigation. Defendants seek
an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-120(1), §12-120(3) and §12-121.
Defendants are the prevailing party. All claims raised by Plaintiffs' Complaint were

Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees
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dismissed. The Complaint arose from a commercial transaction and is transaction covered
by the attorney fee provisions of §12-120(1), §12-120(3). This Memorandum of Costs and
Attorneys' Fees is supported by the Affidavit of Michael R. Jones in Support of
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees tiled concurrently herewith. By way of this
Memorandum of Costs, Defendants Callister, Confluence and Liberty seek an award of
costs as a matter of right in the amount of $244.61, discretionary costs in the amount of
$4.95 and an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $9,010.25.
DATED this

i

day of October 2009.

es
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, certify that on thtf..&( day of October, 2009, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the
methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, to the
following person(s):

E. Don Copple
Ed Guerricabeitia
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE &
COPPLE
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite
600
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise Idaho 83701

U.S. Mail
Certified Mail-Return Receipt requested
){"Fax - 208-386-9428
- By Hand
Overnight
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Michael R. Jones
MICHAEL R. JONES, PLLC
508 N. 13 th Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
P. O. Box 7743
Boise, ID 83707
Telephone: (208) 385-7400
Facsimile: (208) 389-9103
ISS No. 2221
mrjones(wmcleodusa.net
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DA VID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a married couple,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DA VE CALLISTER, an individual,
CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company, and LIBERTY
PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0820018
Affidavit in Support of
Memorandum of Costs
and Attorney Fees

COMES NOW the Defendants, appearing by its attorney of record, Michael R. Jones of
the firm of Michael R. Jones, PLLC, and respectfully submits to the Court this itemized list of
costs and disbursements incurred herein pursuant to Rules 54(d), 54(e)(1), and 54(e)(5) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ADA

)
)
)

ss.

I, Michael R. Jones, being duly sworn, depose and say:
1.
I am attorney of record for Dave Callister ("Callister"), Confluence
Management, LLC ("Confluence"), and Liberty Partners, Inc. ("Liberty") the Defendants in
the above-entitled matter, and I make this affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge.

2.

I have over thirty years of legal experience. I am familiar with the hourly rates
charged by attorneys in this area and certify that the following attorney time and hourly rates
charged in this matter were reasonable and necessary for this case, as were the costs incurred
herein, and further certify that the costs claimed are reasonable and necessary, and that any
discretionary costs claimed were necessary and exceptional.

3.
The following are the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by Defendants
attributable to their defense of the claims brought by Plaintiffs against Defendants. In
preparing this Affidavit, I have combined the time incurred in defense of all the Defendants.
Only a few hours of time my research time for the summary judgment opposition was
allocated soley to Defendant Callister in defense of his individual liability and again for the
novation issues related to Confluence.
4.

The attorneys' fees incurred are as follows:
Attorney
Michael R. Jones
Michael R. Jones
Gary Quigley
Doug Fleenor

Rate
$185.00
$200.00
$150.0
$85.00

Hours
10.90
27.95
6.10
5.;5

TOTAL

Fee
$2016.50
$5590.00
$915.00
$488.75

$9010.25

The amount claimed is based upon an evaluation of all the time spent on this case. The
attorney fees charged to Defendants are set forth on Exhibit A and incorporated herein by
reference.
5.
The following are the costs which are recoverable as a matter of right pursuant
to Rule 54(d)(I)(c):
Court Filing Fees:
Deposition Transcript Fees
Deposition of Dave Callister

$58.00
$186.61
$186.61

TOTAL

$244.61
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6.
The following are the costs Defendants incurred in obtaining copies of
documents from the Ada County Highway District that were used in defense of the lawsuit and
in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. The photocopy costs are
recoverable in the Court's discretion under Rule 54(d)(l)(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. The amount of claimed discretionary costs is the amount of $4.95.
7.
In total, Defendants claim costs as a matter of right and attorneys fees in the
amount of $244.61, discretionary fees in the amount of $4.95 and attorney fees in the amount of
$9,010.25. The total amount claimed for all costs and attorney fees is the sum of $9,259.81.

MICHAEL R. JO~9JLLC

d?~*-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ of October 2009.

DATED this

1 day of October 2009.

04lT1ctJ fAJ Il~

N ry ublic, State of-Idaho
Residing at 60~ ~0J
My Commission Expires: ~ d-A., cJV\.l
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1, the undersigned, certify that on the ~ day of October, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the
methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, to the
following person(s):

E. Don Copple
Ed Guerricabeitia
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE &
COPPLE
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite
600
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise Idaho 83701

U.S. Mail
Certified Mail-Return Receipt requested

)rFax - 208-386-9428
By Hand
Overnight
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Michael R. Jones PLLC
Work-in-Progress
To Oct 8/2009
Che7Inv ----·RetaIner-j)1SJ:lUrsement
Client: 229
Liberty Partners, Inc.
Matter: 990752
Defend suit filed by David and Shirley Fuller
Get 28/2008 La~yer: mrj 0.20 Hrs X 185.00
17609 Telephone call with client regarding
suit filed by Fullers.
l~C:"J
~a~Jer: mrj
0 50 Hrs X 185.00
1:6:0 Telephone call with client and receipt
and review of documents.
Nov 6/20C8 Lawyer: mrj 0.05 Hrs X 185.00
17576 Telephone call with client left
message to call.
,)uO
Lawyer: mrj 0.10 Hrs X "i85.00
1 7 577 Telephone call with client regarding
strategy and fees.
Nov 12/2008 Lawyer: mrj 0.75 Hrs X 185.00
17578 Telephone call and message to
plaintiffs' counsel EG regarding
appearance and prepare notice of
appearance and draft letter and email
to plaintiffs' counsel.
La~yer: mrj
0.50 Hrs X 185.00

Fee/Time

37.00

92.50

9.25

1850

138.75

92 50

Telephone call with plaintiffs'
counsel regarding case and settlement
potential; Telephone call with olient
regarding conversation with counsel and
ema~l regarding clarifications to
stelt'"S of develcpment and property for
sale.
17580

Jee 20/2008

17584

0.50 Hrs X 185.00
Telephone call with plaintiffs'
counsel regarding case and rejection of
settlement: Telephone call with client
regarding conversation with counsel.
Lawyer: mrj 0.60 Hrs X 185.00
Preparati~n of
offer of
compromise/settlement.
Lawyer: mrj 3.50 Hrs X 185.00
?reparation of draft answer to
complaint.
Lawyer: mrj 2.00 Hrs X 185.00
Review of varioGs sales agreements and
drafting answer and Telephone call with
c~~ent regarding answer and settlement
offer.
Lawyer: mrj 1.20 Hrs X 185.00
Drafting affirmative defenses:
authority of president in individual

Lawyer: mrj

92.50

13..1.00

647.50

370.00

222.00

capacity.

Dec 22/2C08

Ja;)

8/2009

17587

Ja;)

009
17588

Jan 13./2009

Clerk of District Court
Answer and Counterclaim
La~rfer: mrj
1.00 Hrs X 185.00
Review final answer with client.
Lawyer: mrj 0.50 Hrs X 200.00
Telephone call with R. Thurber
regarding purchase and sale matters.
Lawyer: mrj 0.50 Hrs X 200.00
Telephone call with ACRO
representatives regarding record review
and request to see records.
Lawyer: mrj 0.10 Hrs X 200.00
cail with ACHD
representative regarding time to come
and review records.
Ada County Highway District

2932

58.00
185.00
100.00

100.CO

20.00

2948

4.95

16653
n6:~

Feb

2/2009
17590

Lawyer: mrj 3 75 Hrs X 200 00
Review of records at ACHD travel to
ACHD.
La~/er: ~rj
1.20 Hrs X 200.00
Preparation of scheduling stipulation
and Telephone call with plaintiff's
counsel EG. Make corrections to
stipulatio~ forward to plaintiffs'
counsel. Fax stipulation to Court and
Telephone call with Judge Wilper's
Clerk and emails to plaintiffs' counsel

~~

0.00
O. CO

'}{)"]:"I
L..

18/2G08

Cc:rcer,t A'
Trc:st

750.00

240.00

veL

Michael R. Jones PLLC
Work-in-Progress
1l
rrf
~!() _(Jct __8D_00L
~
Chejlnv
Retainer
Fee7Time
'--~_~IIIIIIIII_IIIIIIII-~_~_~ _______.___._. __ ~ ________ ._.~_._~_. __

/ LVU';.t

z

['ate

.Entry#
Feb

6/2009

17591

Feb

9/2009
17615

009

Feb

17448

Feb 12/2009
175S2

Feb

:.-JI
176~6

Feb 16/2009
17594

Feb l7/2C09
176:: 7

Feb 23/2C09

17596
Feb 23

JUCl

6/2009

17598

Jun 27/2009
17599
29/2
1747::

2/2009
17472

':ul

6/2009

17501

3 __

EG regarding hearing vacated.
Lawyer: mrj 0.20 Hrs X 200.00
Telephcne call with client regarding
status and plan of defense.
Lawyer: DF 3.50 Hrs X 85.00
Legal Research Idaho and case law of
merger officers and directors personal
liability.
;:.awyer: DF 2.25 Hrs X 85.00
Legal Research elements of novation
and wai'v'·er.
Lav.yer: mrj 0.30 Hrs X 200.00
Telephone call with client regarding
discovery responses.
La'tlyer: mrj 0.60 Hrs X 200.00
Telephone call with First American
Title and counsel; Telephone call with
client's realtor. Review of discovery
!:'esponses.
Lawyer: mrj 0.30 Hrs X 200.00
Correspondence to plaintiffs' counsel
EG regarding deposition of Dave
Callister.
Lal<yer: mrj 2.75 Hrs X 200.00
Drafting Defendants First set of
discovery of plaintiffs.
Lawyer: mrj 0.05 Hrs X 200.00
Email to plaintiffs' counsel regarding
Callister deposition
La*ye:: mrj 0.20 Hrs X 200.00
ema:ls regarding depositions and
Telephone call with client regarding
deposition schedules.
Lawye:: mrj 3.25 Hrs X 200.00
Attendance at deposition of David
Callister.
f~ & i'i Court Reporting
Deposition David Callister
Lawyer: mrj 1.20 Hrs X 200.00
Review of pleadings and deposition and
discovery.
2:.awyer: gary 2.80 Hrs X 150.00
Legal Research and review of cases
cited by plaintiff in motion for
sU:Emary judgement memo.
Lawyer: gary 3.30 Hrs X 150.00
Drafting response memorandum to
summary judgement motion.
Lawyer: mrj 3.80 Ers X 200.00
Drafting memorandum and affidavit of
counsel and research issue of novation.
La~jer: mrj
1.50 Hrs X 200.00
Drafting and final review of

Current

:,:urrent Trust

40.00

297.50

191. 2S

60.00

120.00

60.CO

550.0C

10.00
40.00

650.00
3008

186.61
240.00

420.00

495.00

760.00

300.00

memora.ndum.
J·c1 20/2009

17603

Ju ... 2; /2009

1 604
F.Ug 25/2009

17605
r.t:.g 27/2Q09
7606

Lawyer: mrj 1. 00 Hrs X 200.00
Review of plaintiffs' reply brief.
Lawyer: mrj 4.00 Hrs X 200.00
Preparation for hearing and attend
hearing on motion for summary
judgement; email to client regarding
hearing.
Lawyer: mrj 0.50 Hrs X 200.00
Conference with appraiser regarding
being expert witness for defense.
Lawyer: mrj 0.75 Hrs X 200.00
Review of court memorandum decision
and email to client.
Lawyer: mrj 1.50 Hrs X 200.00
Prepare proposed final judgement and
memorandum of costs and affidavit of

200.00
800.00

100.00

150.00
300.00
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~--"~~~~!1""~Michael R. Jones PLLC
51
~
Work-in-Progress
To

£"

I

Pa:'d
E:ltry#

Oct

Page

8/2009

che;Inv----~~Retainer -Disbursement

Fee/Time

A/R Sal
Current 7rust Ba:

Exp}an<"lt:i~ol1_

Total:
Unbilled
Michael R. Jones
of !~at cers

Hours
Fees
+ Disbs
~ Retainers
Total:
+

- Gary Qu::'gley
:-:'-.4mter c£ t"iatters 1

Hours
Fees
Disbs
- Retainers
Total:
+
+

Doug Fleenor
of Matters 1

Hours
Fees
+ Disbs
Retainers
Total:
+

5308.20

Current

31-60 Days

61-90 Days

9l-120 Days

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

2.25
450.00
0.00
0.00

5.50
1100.00
0.00
0.00

6.50
1300.00
186.61
0.00

-0:-00

450-.-0-0

-rIO-O.OO

--1486:Kf

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0:00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

-----0.00

6.10
915.00
0.00
0.00
--915.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

--O~

~~O:OO

----0.0-0

---0.00

>120 Days

Total

24.60

38.8S
7606.50
249.56
0.00

---

4756.50
62.95
0.00
4819.45

7856.-06

0.00
0.00
0_00
0.00

6. 10
915. 00
o. 00
O. 00

----0'60

~~s.

OD

5.75
488.75

488.75

0.00
0.00

0.00
O.OC

488 75

~488.75

5.75
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E DON COPPLE
ED GUERRICABEITIA
DA VISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Oilice Box] 583
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 342-3658
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428
ISB Nos.: 1085 & 6148
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
David and Shirley Fuller
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DA VID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a married couple,)
Plaintiffs,
\"S.

)
)

)
)
)
)

DA VE CALLISTER, an individual,
)
CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Idaho )
)
Limited Liability Company, and LIBERTY
)
PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho corporation,
)
)
Defendants.

CASE NO.: CV OC 0820018
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION
TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

COME NOW the Plaintiffs, David and Shirley Fuller, by and through their attorneys of
record, Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, and hereby submits this memorandum with the
foregoing case authority and legal arguments in support of their Motion.
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I. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Plaintiffs Did Not Defend This Lawsuit Frivolously,
Unreasonably or Without Foundation.
Idaho Code § 12-121 grants the court discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party. Attorney fees are awarded under this section only if the position advocated by
the nonprevailing party was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation. Dominguez v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7,121 P.3d 938 (2005); see also,
Associates iV. W v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 733 P.2d 824 (Ct.App.1987) and Jerry J Joseph

c.L. U.

Ins. Assocs. V Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 789 P.2d 1146 (Ct.App.1990) .

Rule 54( e)(1) and (e )(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure have supplemented Idaho
Code § 12-121 and requires the court to make a written finding, either in the award or a separate
document as to the basis and reasons for award such fees. Need v. Idaho State Dep '[ of Cor., 115
Idaho 399, 766 P.2d 1280 (Ct.App.1988).
Rule 54( e)( 1) entitled attorney fees of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states:
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or
parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(I)(B), when provided for by any statute or
contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation; but attorney fees shall not be awarded pursuant to section 12-121,
Idaho Code, on a default judgment.
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment against Defendants on their affirmative defenses
of the doctrine of merger and novation and that Defendant Confluence Management breached its
contractual agreement with Plaintiffs for failing and refusing to turn over the condemnation
proceeds pursuant to their agreement providing for a reservation of the ACHD condemnation
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES - 2
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proceeds that all parties had actual knowledge that ACHD sought to condemn a portion of the
land prior to execution of the agreement. The primary fact was that the reservation of the
condemnation proceeds which was clear and unambiguous in the agreement.
Plaintiffs provided legal support of their position from other jurisdictions that held a
reservation of the condemnation proceeds provided under a valid agreement was enforceable.
Those same jurisdictions also adhered to principles set forth in the doctrine of merger.
Ddcndants provided no case authority to the contrary.
This Court held as a matter of law that a reservation of condemnation proceeds in the
agreement was a .. term is the right of alienation of the property" and therefore the doctrine of
merger applies. 1
Plaintiffs also cited authority from Idaho and other jurisdictions defining and
distinguishing the distinct legal theories of novation and assignment. In the instant case,
Plaintiffs merely consented to Defendants Confluence and Liberty Partners assignment, but did
not execute any document releasing Confluence of its obligations and liability under the
agreement. Defendants provided the Court the law on an assignment which Plaintiffs did not
dispute governed that theory under [daho law. The Court held that the assignment transferred
Confluence's rights over to Liberty Partners and denied Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the
novation defense.
Although the Court disagreed with the case authority cited by Plaintiffs in support of their
motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss two of Defendants' affirmative defenses, it is
evident from the record that Plaintiffs did not bring, pursue or defend this case frivolously,

I Memorandum Decision and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, p. 4.
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unreasonably and without foundation in law of fact.
Simply because a Court disagrees with the application and interpretation of cited case
authority to the facts of a case does not render the pursuit or defense of such proposition
frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. Otherwise, in all cases the party who is on the
other side of the Court's decision either brought, pursued or defended the case frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation and an award of attorney fees would be mandatory, contrary
to 1.R.c.P. 54(e)(l) and Idaho Code § 12-121 provides.
Plaintiffs respectfully requests that this Court find that they did not bring, pursue or
defend this lawsuit frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. There was no dispute of
fact that Liberty Partners was aware of the reservation of the condemnation proceeds, accepted
the condemnation proceeds and converted the proceeds for its benefit.2
B. Defendants' are not entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees
under Idaho Code § 12-120(1) or (3).

Defendants seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(1), (3) and
12-121 and Rule 54( e)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The latter premises are
addressed above and will not be reiterated.
Idaho Code § 12-120(1) applies to civil actions plead for $25,000 or less. In the instant
case, Plaintiffs pled for damages over $83,000 that was taken by Defendants, therefore rendering
this section inapplicable for an award of attorney fees.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) reads in pertinent part:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of
:2 The record reflected that Dave Callister was a member and sole shareholder of both Confluence Management,
LLC and Liberty Partners, Inc.
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
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goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes ...
Defendants allege that they incurred attorneys' fees in the amount of $9,0 10.25 in this
case. It is alleged that the firm of Michael R. Jones, PLLC expended a total of 50.70 hours for
both its clients in defending this action. See Affidavit of Michael R. Jones, p. 2.
Under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), the Court must determine that the gravamen of the case
involves a "commercial transaction" and which party was the "prevailing party."
"A two-prong test exists for awarding attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). First, an
alleged commercial transaction must be integral to the claim. Second, the commercial
transaction must be the basis upon which a party is attempting to recover." Andrea v. City

(~l

Coeur D'Alene, 132 Idaho 188, 190, 968 P.2d 1097 (App.1998).
In Bastian v. Albertson's. Inc .. 102 Idaho 909, 643 P.2d 1079 (App.1982), the Idaho
Court of Appeals aHirmed the district court's denial of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12120(2) \\hich is now Idaho Code § 12-120(3) contending that said provision, on its face, was not
applicable to the dispute between the tenant and landlord under the lease agreement. See also,

Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc., v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 978 P.2d 233 (1999).
In the instant case, the issue related to whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to ACHD
condemnation proceeds incorporated and reserved in the addendum of the agreement. The
PlaintitTs sold their personal residence and land to Defendants Callister and Confluence
tvlanagement, LLC. The reservation of the condemnation proceeds was not an integral
commercial transaction contemplated by Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Rather, the reservation of the
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
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condemnation proceeds went to the purchase price of the real property sold to Defendants.
Because the claim asserted by Plaintiffs did not involve a commercial transaction as
contemplated by the provision, Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney fees under
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and therefore Defendants request for attorney fees must be denied.

C. Defendants' Request For $9,010.25 As Attornev Fees Is Excessive And Unreasonable.
If the Court finds that the issue involved was a commercial transaction, then in
determining the prevailing party, the Court's examination involves a three part inquiry: 1) the
result obtained in relation to the relief sought; 2) whether there were multiple issues or claims;
and 3) the extent to which either party prevailed on each issue and claim. Joseph CL. U Ins.

Assoc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 557 (App. 1990).
What constitutes a reasonable attorney fee is a discretionary determination for the trial
court, to be guided by the criteria of LR.C.P. 54(e)(3). Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 326,
1 P.3d 823 (App.2000). "This amount may be more or less than the sum which the prevailing
party is obligated to pay its attorney under their agreement." See id.
"A court is permitted to examine the reasonableness of the time and labor expended by
the attorney under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) and need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the
attorney ... An attorney cannot 'spend' his time extravagantly and expect to be compensated by
the party who loses at trial." Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, 134 Idaho 259, 263, 999
P.2d 914 (App.2000) (quoting Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701
P.2d 324, 326 (Ct.App.1985». "Hence, a court may disallow fees that were unnecessarily and
unreasonably incurred or that were the product of attorney 'churning.'" Id.
LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) sets forth criteria for which the Court must consider in determining
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
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what is a reasonable fee to be awarded. The factors include time and labor required; novelty and
difficulty of the issues; skill and experience of counsel; prevailing charges for like work; whether
fee is fixed or contingent; amount involved and results obtained; undesirability of case; awards in
similar cases and several others.
In the instant case and assuming a commercial transaction was involved, PlaintifTs do not
dispute that Defendants prevailed in light of the fact this Court entered summary judgment in
favor of Defendants in its entirety.
However, Plaintiffs do dispute and challenge the reasonableness of the attorney fees
allegedly incurred by Defendants and contend that the fees incurred by Defendants are excessive
in light of the time and work performed in this case by counsel of all the parties involved in this
matter.
In reviewing the time records submitted by affidavit, a careful examination of said
records show that counsels' time was excessive, duplicate and unreasonable for work performed
for certain items.
The principal issue involved in this case was whether the reservation of the condemnation
proceeds in the addendum was breached by Defendants for failing to turn-over the proceeds. It
was undisputed that Defendants accepted the condemnation proceeds and failed to forvvard the
proceeds to Plaintiffs per the terms of the agreement. The issue was identical for all Defendants
and \vork performed by its counsel was same tor all Defendants. Defendants, jointly,
propounded only one set of discovery requests, no depositions were taken by Defendants and the
matter was resolved in summary judgment by the Court. All in all, Defendants contend that its
counsel incurred a total of 50.70 hours of time spent in detending this case on their behalf.
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
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Counsel for Plaintiffs has broken down the fees and time spent that they contend

was

excessive, unreasonable and/or duplicate work performed.
According to the time entries, Defendants' counsel, Michael Jones, expended 7.70 hours
at $185 per hour preparing, drafting, discussing and finalizing Defendants' Answer to the
lawsuit.3
The facts were fairly simple and mostly undisputed and the doctrine of merger was the
only affirmative defense that had any legal merit. The remaining defenses were boilerplate
defenses with only a scintilla of evidence in support thereof.
The preparation of the answer for two causes of actions being asserted should have taken
less than half of the time Defendants allege was incurred. Although some time should have been
incurred to respond to the Complaint, three (3) hours would have been reasonable to prepare the
Ansvver Defendants' filed.
On January 13,2009, Defendants counsel alleges he incurred 3.75 hours at $200 per hour
for traveling and reviewing records at ACHD. Plaintiffs' claim that this entry is excessive and
unreasonable on the grounds that Defendants could have obtained the same information under a
Freedom of Information request at substantially less expense than counsel incurred and the same
information was provided by Plaintiffs' in response to Defendants first and only set of discovery.
A letter should have been prepared that at most should have taken twenty (20) minutes or
.33 hours, if that, to prepare the request for the information.
On February 6 and 7, 2009, Doug Fleenor expended 5.75 hours at $85 per hour
performing legal research on the doctrine of merger, otlicer's personal liability, elements of

3 See AlT. of Jones, Exhibit A, entries dated December 18,19,20, and 23, 2008.
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES - 8

00046

novation and waiver.
On June 29 and July 2, 2009, Gary Quigley expended 6.10 hours at $150 per hour
reviewing cases cited by Plaintiffs in their memorandum and preparing a response memorandum
to the PlaintitTs' motion.
On July 3 and 6, 2009, Michael Jones expended 5.3 hours drafting and finalizing the
memorandum, preparing a 2 page af1idavit attaching 3 exhibits and researching the issue of
novation (\vhich Defendants cited no case authority on the issue).
Defendants did not file a counter motion for summary judgment nor raised or presented
any evidence in the record on Defendant Callister's personal liability which this Court granted.
In all, the submission of one brief: including legal research performed. and a 2 page
aftidavit in response to the motion for partial summary judgment allegedly entailed 13.65 hours
between the counsel.
Interestingly, Defendants agreed on Plaintiffs' representation on the law of merger in
Idaho and cited no other authority to the contrary on the specific issue. Furthermore. Defendants
cited no case authority on the issue of novation, but provided the Court authority on an
assignment.
PlaintifTs respectfully request the Court reduce the alleged time expended by the counsel
in preparing Defendants' response to the motion for partial summary judgment to a reasonable
amount of time of 9 hours.
For the reasons and arguments set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the
Court reduce the total hours expended by Michael Jones as follows:
1)

10.90 hours @ $185/hr. to 6.20 hours @ $185/hr. for a total 01'$1,147.00; and

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
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,

.

.
2)

27.95 hours@ $200/hr. to 19.88 hours @$200/hr. for a total 0[$3,976.00.

In total. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the total amount of the fees allegedly incurred
be reduced trom $9.010.25 to $6,526.75 based upon the reasons and arguments set forth above.

D. Costs
The only cost that Plaintiffs' dispute is the discretionary costs of $4.95 for photocopies of
ACED documents as those costs were not exceptional costs reasonably incurred and in the
interest of justice should not be assessed against Plaintiffs.
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintitls respectfully request that the Court deny
Defendants request for attorney fees for failing to state a provision authorizing the Court to
award attorney fees and award only those costs as a matter of right.
In the alternative. PlaintitTs request the Court enter its order reducing the Defendants
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees to a total amount of $6,771.36.
DATED this 21 sl day of October, 2009.
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE, LLP

By:~~~~~~~~~~~________

ED GUERR CABEITIA, of the firm
Attorneys for PlaintiiTs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21 st day of October, 2009 a true and correct original of
the foregoing was served upon the following by the method indicated below:
Michael R. Jones
Michael R. Jones PLLC
508 North 13 th Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

/U.S.MAIL
_ _ Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission:

Ed Guerricabeitia
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Michael R. Jones
MICHAEL R. JONES, PLLC
P.O. Box 7743
508 North 13th Street
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone:
(208) 385-7400
Facsimile:
(208) 389-9103
ISB No. 2221
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DAVID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a
married couple,

)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0820018

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

vs.
DA VE CALLISTER, an individual,
CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company, and
LIBERTY PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho
corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS= REPLY TO
PLAINTIFFS= MEMORANDUM TO
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES

)

Defendants.

)

COMES NOW the Defendants in the above-captioned action, by and through their counsel
of record, Michael R. Jones, and submits the following Reply to the Plaintiffs' Memorandum to
Disallow Costs and Attorney fees.

1.

Entitlement. Although alternative statutory grounds were stated for an award of

attorney fees to the prevailing party defendants in this action, that statute which most clearly

DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM
TO DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES -- PAGE 1
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applies is

I.e. §12-120(3) providing an award in a claim arising out of a commercial transaction.

In Heritage Excavation, Inc. v. Briscoe, 141 Idaho 40, 105 P.3d 700 (CLApp.2005) the Court
followed the relatively long-standing precedent to grant attorney fees to the prevailing party under

I.e.

§ 12-120(3) in litigation involving contracts to purchase real estate.

The Court held as

follows:
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously concluded that the test for
application of this statute is whether a commercial transaction comprises the
gravamen of the lawsuit; that is, whether the commercial transaction is integral to
the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover.
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 776,890 P.2d 714,727 (1995). In Farm Credit
Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 274-75, 869 P.2d 1365, 1369-70
(1994) the Idaho Supreme Court held that a transaction to finance the purchase of
real property which was intended to be used for commercial farming operations
was a commercial transaction under I.e. § 12-120(3). We conclude that
litigation regarding the existence of a contract to purchase real property for
the purpose of a housing development likewise falls under I.e. §12-120(3).
Accordingly, Briscoe as the prevailing party is awarded his attorney fees.
141 Idaho at 40, 105 P.3d at 705 (emphasis added).

The Defendants in this action were

purchasing the Fuller property for use in their commercial real estate development activities,
which falls squarely within the scope of activities constituting "commercial transactions," in the
just-cited Briscoe decision.
The opinion in Bastian v. Albertson's, Inc., 102 Idaho 909, 643 P.2d 1079 (CLApp.1982),
upon which the Plaintiffs Fuller rely in opposing an award of attorney fees to the defendants under

I.e.

§ 12-120(3), was decided before the "commercial transaction" language was added to that

statute in 1986, and thus it no longer stands for the proposition cited under existing law. This fact
was noted by the Court of the Appeals in Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 900 P.2d 201
(Ct.App. 1995):
In resisting this request for attorney fees, the Herricks rely upon Bastian v.
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Albertson's, Inc., 102 Idaho 909, 915, 643 P.2d 1079,1085 (CLApp. 1982), where
we said that Section 12-120 was inapplicable to a lease of real property. This
reliance is misplaced, for the Bastian decision was rendered before a 1986
amendment to Section 12-120 which added the provision mandating attorney fees
in actions arising out of commercial transactions. 1986 Idaho Sess.Laws, ch. 205
at 511-12. A transaction for commercial farming operations was found to be a
"commercial transaction" under I.e. § 12-120(3) in Farm Credit Bank ofSpokane v.
Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 275, 869 P.2d 1365, 1370 (1994).
127 Idaho at 306, 900 P.2d at 214.
The Defendants, as the prevailing parties in this action, are entitled to an award of attorney
fees under

I.e.

§12-120(3), in accordance with the authority cited above in the Briscoe decision.

On that basis the Defendants will not further pursue the justification for an award of attorney fees
under either I.C. §12-120(l), or I.e. §12-121.

2.

Right to Discretionary Costs

The Plaintiffs object to the Defendants request for $4.95 in discretionary costs. This
amount, on its face, appears so insignificant that it should not merit further argument.

But in this

case, because this claim also relates to the general allegation made by the Fullers that the amount
of attorney fees requested by the defendants is unreasonable, it does merit some further discussion.
The Defendants made discovery requests to the Fullers for the documents in their
possession concerning the ACHD condemnation of the property that the Fullers had sold to
Liberty Partners, the proceeds of which sale was the primary issue in this action. The requested
ACHD documents included correspondence, appraisals, memoranda, and the like. The Fullers
responded by refusing to disclose the documents in their possession and instead simply stating that
these documents were equally accessible to the defendants directly from ACHD.
A party in this circumstance is confronted with the option of either going to the effort and
cost of filing a motion to compel, and going to hearing on that motion, or simply going to ACHD
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and obtaining the requested documents. The defendants in this instance opted for the latter course
of action.
ACHD had informed counsel that it had about 15 bankers boxes of documents concerning
the entire 1O-mile road condemnations, of which the Fullers' property was only a very small part.
In total, it took nearly four hours to review the documents related to the Fullers' property after they
were located by ACHD Counsel for Defendants had to identify those relevant to this case, ask that
they be copied, and then retrieve those copies. The total copying cost was $4.95 which is the
discretionary cost claim that is at issue here.
Among the documents located in the ACHD records was the October 28, 2005 letter to the
Fullers from ACHD in which ACHD declared that it was compelled by controlling Idaho law to
negotiate only with the owner of record -- which at that date was Liberty Partners, not the Fullers.
This letter was attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Michael R. Jones, submitted in opposition
to the Fullers' motion for summary jUdgment, and was one of the critical pieces of evidence that
led to this Court's decision in this case denying the Fullers' claim to the ACHD condemnation
proceeds.
Under these circumstances, the imposition of this $4.95 copying cost, as a direct result of
the Fullers refusal to comply with a reasonable and limited discovery request, was exceptional,
necessary, and reasonable, and this $4.95should be awarded to the Defendants as a discretionary
cost.

3.

Reasonableness of the Fees Claimed

The Fullers request an overall reduction of almost a third (27%) in the attorney fees
claimed from $9,010.25 to $6,526.75, or a reduction of $2,483.50.
As already noted above in respect to the discretionary costs, the Fullers have objected to
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the Defendants' claims for 3.75 hours to search for, and obtain documents from ACHD. They
argue that instead these documents could have been obtained by simply writing a letter and
requesting the documents under the Public Records Act,

I.e.

§9-338, for which only a charge of

.33 hours would be appropriate. To begin with, the availability of records by an alternative means
is not reason to allow a party to avoid or shirk its responsibilities under the discovery rules. As
already noted above, the easiest avenue to obtain these records would have been for the Fullers to
simply comply with the Defendants' discovery request, which they did not. Second, the Idaho
Public Records Act only creates a right to inspect and copy, not a right to compel any agency to
devote its staff time to answering such a request. Agencies are allowed to charge for time
expended in locating and copying records.

I.e. §9-338(8).

Under these circumstances the costs

incurred were reasonable and necessary.
The Fullers also contest the amount of time expended in answering the complaint, and
researching and writing the response to their summary judgment complaint. Specifically they
object to the 7.70 hours spent by Michael Jones in "preparing, drafting, discussing, and finalizing"
the answer. There is more involved than the mere drafting of an answer to a complaint. This
time includes consultation with the client, analysis of the claims made, review of client documents
and the determination of relevant affirmative defenses.

While the Fullers desire that the

Defendants had only expended three hours on these tasks is understandable, the fact that additional
time was spent did result in the pleading of the affirmative defenses that led to a successful
determination of this case for the defendants. In the context of the real estate transaction itself,
the related ACHD condemnation, the challenge to the assignment between Confluence and
Liberty, and the other related legal issues, the expenditure of 7.70 hours appears to be rather
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economical and should be awarded in its entirety.
The Fullers also object to a total of 5.75 hours spent conducting research at a rate of $85 per
hour on the defense theories of merger, officer liability, novation, and waiver. This activity was
detailed to a lower-billing individual and required the examination of the case law cited by the
Plaintiff Fullers and the identification, review, and development of the legal argument in
opposition to the Fullers' claims. In opposing the assignment between Confluence and Liberty,
the Fullers attempted to adapt the specialized law that applies between lessors, lessees, and
sub-lessees to the factual situation in this case that involved no lessors or lessees.

Such

allegations by the Fullers required the defendants to expend additional time to examine the Fullers'
unconventional theories, and to determine their inapplicability, and to identify the appropriate
rules that should otherwise be applied to the facts of this case. In this context 5.75 hours does not
appear to be at all excessive.
In total, counsel that worked on the summary judgment briefing expended 13.65 hours in
reviewing the Fullers' motion, memorandum, and supporting authority; and in researching and
reviewing opposing authority, drafting the memorandum, and applying the law to the facts.
Significant legal issues involving merger, novation, and assignment were involved in this case.
The expenditure of that amount of time is not at all extraordinary or unreasonable in the context of
the factual questions that were at issue, in developing the record, in identifying the law, in applying
the law to the facts, and drafting and revising the memorandum. Consequently, the Defendants
should be awarded the full amount of time claimed.
In total, it is not at all apparent, based upon the factual and legal issues raised and
addressed, and the result obtained, that the Fullers have identified any area where the time
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expended by the defendants was at all extravagant, unnecessary, redundant, or unrelated to this
case. In the context of the prevailing charges for similar work, and in obtaining a similar result,
the charges for costs and attorney's fees as claimed by the defendants are entirely reasonable and
justified and should be awarded in their entirety, as claimed.

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of November, 2009.

Attorney for the Defendants.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 6th day of November, 2009, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM TO
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES upon the plaintiffs by the method indicated and
addressed as follows:

E. DON COPPLE
[
ED GUERRICABEITIA
[
DA VISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
[ ]
[X]
Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
[ ]
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701-1583
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428
Email:
guerricabetitia@davisoncopple.com

u.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile Transmission
Other _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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'/

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDIC

2

OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTYOF ADA

3
4

DA VID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a
married couple,

Case No. CV OC 0820018

5
6

Plaintiffs,

ORDER ON COSTS AND FEES

vs.

7

8

9

10
11

DAVE CALLISTER, an individual,
CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability Company, and
LIBERTY PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Defendants.

12

This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Defendants' Costs
13

14

and Attorney Fees and Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay Decision on Attorney Fees and Costs Pending

15

Appeal. The Court heard oral arguments on the motions on November 9, 2009. Ed Guerricabeitia

16

appeared for the Plaintiffs and Michael R. Jones appeared for the Defendants. The Court took the

17

matters fully under advisement at that time.

18

BACKGROUND

19

Plaintiffs owned a parcel of real property in Ada County. Plaintiffs were in the process of
20

negotiating with the Ada County Highway District (ACHD) on reasonable compensation for certain
21
22

easement rights or a fee of a portion of the property via eminent domain. On September 20, 2005,

23

Plaintiffs

and

Defendant

Confluence

Management

LLC

(Confluence)

entered

24

Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement. That same day, Plaintiffs and

25

Defendant Confluence signed an Addendum to the Purchase and Sale Agreement. Plaintiffs did not

26
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into

a

complete negotiations with ACHD prior to transferring the property under the purchase and sale
1

2

agreement. On September 22, 2005, Plaintiffs and Defendants signed another addendum which

3

assigned certain rights to Defendant Liberty Partners. Defendant Callister is both a member of

4

Confluence and the President of Liberty Partners. Also on September 22, 2005, Plaintiffs executed a

5

warranty deed transferring the property to Liberty Partners. It is undisputed that the warranty deed

6

does not contain the language of the first addendum. On August 10, 2006, Liberty Partners executed

7

a Sale and Purchase Agreement and warranty deed which transferred approximately one twelfth of
8

the property to ACHD. On August 25, 2006, ACHD paid Liberty Partners $83,921.00 for the
9

10
11

smaller segment of the property. Plaintiffs seek the ACHD proceeds under the language of the
Addendum.

12

On August 24, 2009, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order granting

13

Defendants' motion for summary judgment holding that the contract had merged with the warranty

14

deed. l On September 28,2009, the Court entered Judgment against the Plaintiffs dismissing Count

15

One and Count Two of the Complaint. On October 9, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal and
16

Defendants filed a memorandum and an affidavit for costs and fees.
17
18

MOTION TO STAY DECISION ON ATTORNEY FEES

19

AND COSTS PENDING APPEAL

20

Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(9) provides the District Court the express authority to "make any

21

order regarding the taxing of costs or determination of attorneys fees incurred in the trial of an

22

action" during the pendency of an appeal. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure lea) sets the standard for

23

24

25

1 The August 24,2009 Order also denied Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Defendants'
ninth afflrmative defense based on merger of the contract with the warranty deed.

26
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resolution of suits in Idaho, "These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and
1

2

inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."

3

Plaintiffs ask this Court to enter an order staying a decision on an award of costs or attorney

4

fees due to the "novelty of the issues presented in this case" and seeking to prevent this court from

5

"wast[ing] time and effort for naught on the tedious and detailed task of reviewing the claimed costs

6

and attorney fees." Plaintiffs have not alleged good cause or hardship as a basis to stay a decision on

7

attorney fees and costs. The Court finds that judicial economy and the just, speedy, and inexpensive
8

resolution of this action require the Court to undertake the cost and fee analysis at this time.
9

10

Plaintiffs' motion to stay is DENIED.
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

11

12

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1 )(A) states that a prevailing party shall be awarded

13

costs, unless otherwise provided by the Court or limited by the Rules. "The determination of which

14

party is the prevailing party for purpose of awarding costs is within the discretion ofthe trial court."

15

JR. Simplot Co. W Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 584, 977 P.2d 196, 198 (1999). Rule
16

54( d)(1 )(B) lists the factors that this Court must consider in ruling on which party is the prevailing
17
18
19
20
21

22
23

24

party as follows:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the
trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, whether there were
multiple claims, multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, or
other mUltiple or cross issues between the parties, and the extent to which each party
prevailed upon each of such issue or claims. The trial court in its sound discretion
may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part,
and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair
and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the
action and the resultant judgment or jUdgments obtained.

25

26
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As Defendants sought the dismissal of both of Plaintiffs' claims and the Court dismissed
1

2

both claims, Defendants are the prevailing party. Plaintiffs have not objected to the costs as a matter

3

of right claimed by Defendants. Defendants seek costs of $186.61, for a deposition transcript, and

4

$58.00, for the filing fee. These fall squarely within Rule 54(d)(1)(C). The Court awards $244.61 to

5

Defendants as costs as a matter of right.

6

DISCRETIONARY COSTS

7

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(I)(D) commits the decision whether to award certain
8

costs to the discretion of the trial court. Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681, 689, 39 P.3d 621,
9

10

629 (2001). When an objection to discretionary costs is presented, the trial court "shall make

11

express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be

12

allowed." LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). Thus, the Court must make specific findings that each discretionary

l3

cost was 1) necessary, 2) exceptional, 3) reasonably incurred, and 4) should be assessed against the

14

adverse party in the interest of justice. Evans v. State, 135 Idaho 422, 432, 18 P.3d 227, 237 (Ct.

15

App. 2001); Swallow v. Emergency Med. o/Idaho, PA, 138 Idaho 539, 67 P.3d 68 (2003).
16

Defendants seek $4.95 for costs incurred in obtaining documents from ACHD. At oral
17

18

argument Defendants asserted that they are entitled to this cost as Plaintiffs were in possession of

19

the infonnation but declined to provide it and thereby forced Defendants to incur the expense of

20

obtaining it. Plaintiffs argue that such an expense is not exceptional.

21

22

The Court finds that neither Defendants' memorandum of costs and fees nor Defendants'
affidavit of costs and fees asserts that this cost was necessary, exceptional, or reasonably incurred.

23

Further, the Court finds that the cost was not necessary and exceptional as Defendants had the
24
25

26
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option of moving to compel discovery of the document or information. Plaintiffs' motion to
1

2

disallow Defendants' claimed discretionary cost is GRANTED.
ATTORNEY FEES

3

4

Defendants seek an award of $9010.25 in attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-

5

120(1), 12-120(3), and 12-121. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are not entitled to an award of

6

attorney fees under Idaho law and that the claimed attorney fees are excessive and unreasonable.

7

Idaho Code § 12-120(1) provides for attorney's fees in civil actions where the amount pled is
8

twenty-five thousand dollars or less. In the case at hand Plaintiffs sought $83,921.00, the amount
9

10
11

paid by ACHD to Defendants. Defendants are not entitled to recover attorney fees under § 12120(1).

12

Attorney fees may be awarded under § 12-121 only when the Court finds, from the facts

13

presented, "that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without

14

foundation." LR.C.P. 54(e)(I). That Plaintiffs may have intended to reserve the ACHD

15

condemnation proceeds could be inferred from their execution of multiple documents. Although the
16

Court ruled for Defendants, holding that the purchase and sale agreement merged with the warranty
17
18

19

deed, the Court does not find the case was pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Defendants are not entitled to recover attorney fees under § 12-121.

20

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides in pertinent part:

21

In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable

22
23

instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided
by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by
the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.

24
25

The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes.

26
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1
2

"Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.e. § 12-120(3) unless the commercial
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to

3

recover." Brower v. E.I DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345,349 (1990).
4

"[A]n 'award of attorney's fees is not warranted [under I.C. § 12-120(3)] every time a commercial
5
6

transaction is remotely connected with the case. '" Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131

7

Idaho 657, 663, 962 P.2d 1041, 1047 (1998)(quoting Brower, 117 Idaho at 784, 792 P.2d at 349). In

8

the instant case, the transaction giving rise to the litigation was the purchase by Defendants of

9

Plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs sought to recover condemnation proceeds. That Defendants may have

10

purchased the property for commercial purposes is not integral to the claim or constitute the basis

11

on which Plaintiffs were attempting to recover. The Court finds that this was not a commercial
12

transaction. Plaintiffs' motion to disallow attorney fees is GRANTED.
13

14

15

Because the Court finds that Idaho law does not provide for an award of attorney fees in this
instance, the Court does not reach the issue of the reasonability of the claimed attorney fees.

16
17

IT IS SO ORDERED.
18

3 r t-

Dated this _day of December 2009.

19
20
21
22
23

24

25
26
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1

2
3
4
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6

if

I, HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of December 2009, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON COSTS AND FEES to be served by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
Ed Guerricabeitia
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 600
P.O. Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701

(iJ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Michael R. Jones
Michael R. Jones, PLLC
508 N. 13th Street
P.O. Box 7743
Boise, Idaho 83707

f:1,.) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
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( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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( ) Overnight Mail
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8
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Michael R. Jones
MICHAEL R. JONES, PLLC
P.O. Box 7743
508 North 13th Street
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone:
(208) 385-7400
Facsimile:
(208) 389-9103
ISB No. 2221
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
DA VID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a
married couple,

)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 0820018

)

Plaintiffs/Appellants/
Cross-Respondents
vs.

)
)

NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL

)

Class: LA.
Fee: $10 1.00

)
)

DA VE CALLISTER, an individual,
CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company, and
LIBERTY PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho
corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants/Respondents/
Cross-Appellants

TO:

)
)

THE ABOVE NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS, DAVID AND SHIRLEY

FULLER, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS, ED GUERRICABEITIA, ATTORNEY AT LAW,
DA VISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE, W ASHlNGTON MUTUAL CAPITOL PLAZA,
SUITE 600, 199 NORTH CAPITOL BOULEV ARD, POST OFFICE BOX 1583, BOISE, IDAHO
83701-1583, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The

above-named

cross-appellants,

DAVE

CALLISTER.

an

individual,

CONFLUENCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, and LIBERTY
PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho corporation, appeal against the above-named cross-respondents to the
Idaho Supreme Court from the order denying costs and fees to the cross-appellants entered in the
above-entitled action on the 4th day of December, 2009, Honorable Judge Ronald J. Wilper
presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule
11(a)(7) I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement on appeal which the cross-appellant then intends to assert in

the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the cross-appellant from
asserting other issues on appeal.
Did the district court err in denying the cross-appellants, as prevailing parties, an
award of attorney fees?
4.

(a)

Is additional reporter's transcript requested? Yes

(b)

The cross-appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the

reporter's transcript: The November 9,2009 hearing on Defendants' Motion for Costs and Fees.
5.

The cross-appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those designated by the
appellant in the initial notice of appeal:
a.

Order on Costs and Fees (December 4,2009).
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b.

Defendants Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees
(11/06/09).

c.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney
Fees (10/21/09).

d.

Affidavit in Support of Memorandum and Attorney Fees (10/09/09).

e.

Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees (10/09/09).

f.

Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (07/06/09).

g.

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (06/23/09).

6.

I certify:

(a)

That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal and any request for additional transcript has

been served on each reporter of whom an additional transcript has been requested as named below at
the address set out below:
Name and address: Dianne Cromwell, 200 W. Front Street, Boise. Idaho 83702-7300.
(b)

(1) That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the

estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript and any additional documents requested in
the cross-appeal.
(c)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to I.A.R.

20.
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Dated this ~day of January, 2010.

Attorney for the Defendants/Respondents/
Cross-Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this /~4ay of January, 2010, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT upon the plaintiffs by the
method indicated and addressed as follows:
E. DON COPPLE
ED GUERRICABEITIA
DA VISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE
Attorneys at Law
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600
199 North Capitol Boulevard
Post Office Box 1583
Boise, Idaho 83701-1583
Telephone:
(208) 342-3658
Facsimile:
(208) 386-9428
Email:

[ ]U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Deli vered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[Xi Facsimile Transmission
[ ] Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Respondents

Dianne Cromwell
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300
Telephone:
(208) 287-7587

[~~lU.S.

[
[
[
[

Mail, postage prepaid
]Hand Delivered
] Overnight Mail
] Facsimile Transmission
]Oilicr _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Court Reporter
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Stephen W. Kenyon
Clerk of Supreme Court
451 W State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720

In re: Fuller v. Callister, Docket No. 37035

Notice is hereby given that on Thursday, January 28, 2010, I lodged a
transcript of 11 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District.
The following files were lodged:
Proceeding 11/09/09

David Cromwell
Tucker & Associates
cc: kloertscher@idcourts.net
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court
ASCII format of completed files emailed to counsel
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
DA VID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a married couple,

Supreme Court Case No. 37035
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondnets,
vs.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

DAVE CALLISTER, an individual, CONFLUENCE
MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company, and LIBERTY PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.

1,1. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 24th day of February, 2010.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk ofthe District Court

By______________
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
DAVID and SHIRLEY FULLER, a married couple,

Supreme Court Case No. 37035
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondnets,

vs.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

DAVE CALLISTER, an individual, CONFLUENCE
MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company, and LIBERTY PARTNERS, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.
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